Armament of the Russian army in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877

The extremely intense activity of Russian gunsmiths after the Sevastopol war did not turn out to be fruitless; the Russian army had one of the best systems for that time, namely Berdan No. 2. Rearmament, however, was very slow. The Berdan rifle No. 2 was approved in 1870, and meanwhile, by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. due to the industrial backwardness of tsarist Russia, most of the army was armed with modified Krnk and Carle rifles. Berdan's rifles managed to get, in addition to rifle units, only a few corps, and above all the guards and grenadiers. They, however, were sent to the front only in the middle of the war, after the failures suffered by the Russians.

The Turkish army was also armed with two systems: converted Snyder rifles, caliber 14.7 mm (5.77 lin.), with a folding bolt like the Krnk folding bolt and new, caliber 11.43 mm (4.5 lin.), Peabody systems - Martini with a swinging bolt, weighing 4.8 kg with a bayonet (Fig. 82 and 83 represent this rifle with a closed and open bolt).

The Russian and Turkish rifles were quite close in their qualities to each other, the difference was only in cutting the sight distances. As already mentioned above, for 6-line infantry rifles, a sight with the greatest aiming range of up to 600 steps was adopted and for rifle rifles - up to 1,200 steps; for the Turkish troops, the conversion Snyder rifles had a range of up to 1,400 steps; Berdan's new rifles had a scope up to 500 steps, and the new Turkish ones - Peabody-Martini rifles - up to 1,800 steps.

Turkish troops were able to open fire from longer distances, inflicting heavy losses on our troops. The experience of the war showed the complete fallacy of the backward views of the Russian command, that the main type of fire is still fire in volleys from close formation at close range; shortly after the war, the Berdan sight was changed to shoot up to 2,250 paces.

Some shortcomings in arms and hopes of defeating the Turkish armies with insufficient troops were the cause of some of the failures of this campaign; these failures mainly occurred during repeated bloody attacks on the Plevna positions, which were occupied by Osman Pasha's army, which threatened the right flank of the Russian troops advancing south.

The third assault was undertaken by the commander-in-chief of the Russian army - the brother of Emperor Alexander II, who arrived at the time of the fighting at the position - on the day of his name day. During the days of this unsuccessful assault (September 7-13, 1877), Russian troops suffered horrific losses. A well-known song at that time was composed about them:

“A birthday cake from a human filling is being prepared by a brother for a sovereign, And a dashing wind is sweeping across Russia And destroying peasant huts ...”

Despite these individual failures, the Russian people showed their former fighting qualities in this war too - selfless courage, exceptional valor and endurance. This is confirmed by the glorious operations of the Russian army: the crossing of the Danube under the fire of Turkish troops with battles near Sistov, the capture of the fortress of Nikopol, as well as the city of Tyrnov - ancient capital Bulgaria - at the foot of the Balkan Mountains, the final assault on Plevna in November 1877 with the capture of the army of Osman Pasha, the winter crossing through the Balkan steeps and gorges, the famous "Shipka seat", when small Russian forces were attacked by the army of Suleiman Pasha.

“They stand as fearless rocks And proudly await a bloody terrible meeting. Under a hail of bullets and cannonballs and buckshot They stand, Balkan eagles. The days rumble, the nights blaze with fire, The struggle tirelessly boils around, But the enemies cannot break their marvelous urine, Do not take possession of the nest that threatens them ... " Golenishchev-Kutuzov, Eagles

After the defeat of all Turkish armies, peace was concluded in San Stefano, near the capital of Turkey - Constantinople (now Istanbul).

On the eve of the war, Russian artillery had 48 artillery brigades intended for operations with infantry divisions. Each brigade had six batteries - but 8 guns in each battery. The battery was a separate part and could act independently. The first division of the brigade (3 batteries) was armed with 9-lb cannons, the second - with 3-4-lb copper cannons loaded from the treasury! In four Caucasian artillery brigades, one battery each was armed with 3-foot mountain guns.

Horse artillery consisted of 26 regular and 22 Cossack batteries. Ver batteries were six-gun and were armed with rifled copper cannons loaded from the treasury. Each Caucasian division had 2 batteries. The siege artillery had 630 guns of various calibers.

Fortress artillery had 44 fortress battalions. The personnel in case of mobilization was intended for the acquisition of siege artillery, which in peacetime did not have its own personnel. In wartime, 48 spare artillery batteries were formed (according to the number of artillery brigades). In organizational terms, Russian artillery was superior to Turkish. The presence of 48 guns in the division made it possible for its commander to decisively influence the course of the battle. The independence of the batteries allowed them to operate in isolation from the rest of the brigade. In peacetime, a stock of materiel for 48 batteries was kept, and with the start of mobilization, 68 batteries could be formed. This event made it possible to quickly replenish the losses of artillery in the war. Attention is drawn to the careful thoughtfulness of the organization of artillery and its mobilization deployment. The Turks did not have a similar system in other armies of Western Europe. By the beginning of the war, the Russian army had 365 batteries with 2,808 rifled guns. In a short time, the artillery industry of Russia ensured the creation of ratios in our artillery - 4 guns per 1000 bayonets, in horse artillery - 6 guns per 1,000 sabers.

The Turks at that time had 2 guns per 1000 bayonets, and the cavalry had no artillery at all. Each gun had a supply of ammunition as part of one combat set, located in the limbers and charging boxes. The delivery was carried out by artillery limbers, which, during offensive operations, approached the troops. . In the Turkish campaign of 1877 - 1878, the Russian soldier again showed his valor, and the officers and generals - outstanding abilities. Russian artillery had a decisive influence on the entire course of the war. The first event that stunned Western Europe was the successful forcing of the Danube by the main forces of the Russian army at Ztsmnica, carried out in 3-4 days with minimal losses. Russian artillery skilfully secured this crossing, pinning down strong enemy groupings in the fortresses of Ruschuk and Nikopol and clearing the Danube of Turkish ships. In total, up to 100 siege and 100 field guns operating on a 160-kilometer front took part in ensuring the crossing of the Danube. Successful action, artillery contributed good supply ammunition.

6 battles for Nikopol involved 1 ^ 6 field weapons, 33 siege weapons and 4 rapid-fire guns. The battles required a large number of shells. So, from June 25 to July 1, 1877, Russian artillery fired 3248 shells at the Ruschuk fortress, which ensured the blockade of the Turkish flotilla on the Danube.

A significant event was the military operations of the detachment of General Gurko on the Shipka Pass in Bulgaria. At first, Shipka had only 27 guns, while the Turks had 48. Turkish troops occupied commanding heights. However, they did not take the pass. By the end of August, there were already 55 guns and more than 15 thousand soldiers on the pass. Here the difficulty of supplying ammunition affected. On average, artillery had 130 shells per gun, the rest of the ammunition was in the rear. The struggle continued for four months, and the Turks, despite a number of obvious advantages, failed to capture the pass. Under very difficult conditions for the transport of ammunition, Russian artillery used 18,930 shells during the period of fighting on the pass, on some days the consumption exceeded 50 shells per gun. There were very few material losses, almost all damage was repaired at firing positions. In the history of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78, the struggle for Plevna occupies a special place. It began in July 1877 and continued until December 10. The first attack on Plevna involved 40 guns, which used up 1,980 shells. The attack failed. Up to 170 guns participated in the second attack, but due to the poor organization of the assault, the Russian troops again failed.

For the third time, a decision was made to first take possession of Lovcha, a large stronghold south of Plevna. August 3, 1877 Lovcha was taken. The attack on the Turkish positions was provided by 98 guns, which spent 5375 shells in one day, which averaged 58.5 shells per gun. The infantry used up 245 thousand rounds of ammunition - 14 rounds per rifle. The comparison needs no comment. During the third attack of Plevna, 424 guns were concentrated.

However, as a result of the inept use of artillery on September 7, only 152 guns fired, on September 8 - 214, on September 9 and 10 - 226 guns out of 424. The rest were in the second lines and were inactive. shells, which averaged 170 shells per gun. After that, the siege of Plevna began. By the end of the siege, the Russians had 349 guns in the battle line and 186 guns in reserve. The guns were serviceable, of good quality. December 10 Pleveysky garrison capitulated. Further, the Russian army crossed the Balkan mountains and put the Turkish army on the brink of disaster, which forced the Turkish government to request a truce. t. , January 6, 1878 in his order, referring to the soldiers, General Gurko wrote; “The passage through the Balkans is over.

You don’t know what to be more surprised at: your courage and courage in battles with the enemy, or your stamina and patience in enduring hard work in the fight against mountains, frosts and deep snow. Years will pass, and our descendants, having visited these childish mountains, will proudly and triumphantly say: “Russian troops passed here and resurrected the glory of the Suvorov and Rumyandev miracle heroes.” An important condition for the successful operations of artillery in the mountains was the provision of its shells. artillery supply successfully coped, despite the stretching of communications and the backlog of rears. enough were accumulated during the preparatory period. Mobile parks were brought closer to the troops. Each gun had stocks of shells in the limbers and charging boxes.

The Ottoman Empire was going through an acute financial, economic, socio-political and national crisis at that time. Once mighty military power, which made the whole of Europe tremble, was now an economically backward agrarian country with an extremely low level of productive forces. In essence, the country rapidly degraded, destroyed. Turkey was turning into a semi-colony of England, France and other great European powers. Istanbul was thrown into a financial noose and turned into a market for European goods and a source of mainly agricultural raw materials.

Agriculture was practically at the same level as several hundred years ago. Subsistence farming was preserved in the interior regions of Anatolia. The landlords owned the greater and better part of the land and robbed the tenant peasants in every possible way. The tax system, given to the tax-farmers, literally ruined the common people. Usury flourished. The transport network was minimal. The length of the railways of the Ottoman Empire in the 70s was only 1600 km. There was no highway at all, the dirt roads were in very poor condition. The industry was at such a low level of development that almost all consumer goods were purchased in Europe (except for products Agriculture). Turkey did not have enterprises in the steel industry and engineering. The mining industry was in a sorry state. Even the textile industry, once prosperous, fell into complete decline. Turkish businesses and artisans could not compete with European industry. Turkish corruption beat all records. Literally everything was sold and bought, including posts in the administrative apparatus, in the army and police, in the judiciary, etc. The port depended on foreign capital and loans. Foreign capital turned the empire into a market for European goods, subjugated Turkish trade and part of industry. The regime of capitulations to foreign goods suppressed the Turkish economy. At the same time, the Sultan's court and the government themselves were mired in waste and luxury, spending huge sums on entertainment, luxury items and the construction of magnificent palaces.

Political tensions persisted inside the country: the conservatives opposed the supporters of Western-style modernization. The national question sharply aggravated - the uprising in Crete, in Bulgaria, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the war with Serbia and Montenegro. The Christian and Slavic provinces of the Turkish Empire in the Balkans tried to gain independence.

However, Porta still tried to play the role of a great power, at least in the Middle East and dreamed of regaining lost positions in the Northern Black Sea region and the Caucasus, and retaining the Balkans. Therefore, all available funds went to the army and navy.

Army

On the eve of the war with Russia, the Turkish armed forces were reorganized. The reforms went on for 30 years, from 1839 to 1869. The military reform plan was developed by a special commission. In 1869, he was approved and received the force of law. The new organization of the Turkish army was based on the principles of the Prussian landwehr system. The reorganization itself was carried out by Prussian instructors. According to the new law, military service extended to all residents of the Ottoman Empire between the ages of 20 and 29. In fact, military service extended only to the Muslim community. The Christian community, instead of annually exhibiting a certain contingent, was obliged to pay a monetary tax from each man.

The ground forces consisted of three parts: 1) field troops (nizam), 2) reserve troops (redif), 3) militia (mustahfiz). The Nizam was supposed to have 210 thousand people, of which 150 thousand were to be in permanent service, and 60 thousand (Ihtiat) - in reserve, to replenish the active army during the war. The number of the redif was determined at 192 thousand people and the militia - at 300 thousand people. As a result, Turkey could field 700-800 thousand people.

In peacetime, only weak personnel were kept in redif, but stocks of small arms and uniforms were required by law to be at full strength during the deployment period. In wartime, it was planned to form from the redif, separately from the nizam, a certain number of battalions (camps), squadrons and batteries. The militia in peacetime did not have personnel and military supplies. The term of active service in the Nizam was set at 6 years, including the last 2 years in the reserve. In cavalry and artillery, the reserve time was set at 1 year. Persons who served in the nizam were enlisted in the redif for 6 years, and then in the mustahfiz militia for 8 years. The total length of service for those liable for military service in all three units of the ground forces was 20 years.

To complete the army, the entire territory of the Ottoman Empire was divided into six corps districts, which theoretically should have put up an equal number of battalions, squadrons and batteries. In fact, the Danubian and Rumeli districts were stronger, the Arabian and Yemeni districts were weaker than the others, and only the Anatolian and Syrian districts were approaching the average norm. The guards corps was recruited extraterritorially from all districts.

The highest military unit of the army was the corps, which consisted of 2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, an artillery regiment and an engineering company. In total, the Turkish army had 7 corps - 6 army and 1 guards. The division consisted of 2 brigades of 2 regiments each. The infantry regiments were 3-battalion, and the cavalry regiments were 6-squadron. Field artillery batteries had 6 guns each. 3 batteries were reduced to a battalion, and 4 battalions (3 foot and 1 horse) made up a regiment; while 3 battalions were attached to divisions, and the fourth was at the disposal of the corps commander. But in practice, this organization did not take root. As a rule, formations were formed from a different number of units and subdivisions. Even regiments and battalions were not homogeneous in composition.

The new organization of the Turkish army did not have time to settle down to the war with Russia. Thus, out of an annual call of 37,500 people, a significant part of the people in the lower classes did not enter due to financial difficulties and were transferred directly to the redif. As a result, the field army had significantly fewer people in its ranks than was supposed by the states, and the reserve and militia were filled with people who had practically no military training. As a result, of the 700 thousand trained troops that were planned to have by 1878, most of them had no military training. This shortcoming was aggravated by the fact that the adopted organization did not provide for the presence of reserve troops either in peacetime or in wartime. All persons who were called to redif and mustahfiz from among those who did not have military training were to receive it directly in those units where they were called. Also, to a large extent, the deployment of reserve artillery and cavalry in wartime remained on paper: there was a large lack of stocks of artillery and cavalry, it was difficult to create and train these troops in wartime, to find personnel for them.

Irregular troops were recruited in wartime from representatives of the mountain tribes subject to the Ottomans, in particular, Albanians and Kurds, as well as Circassians who moved to Turkey from Russia. They formed an irregular cavalry, carried out garrison service, and performed punitive police functions during the suppression of uprisings. Some of them were called “bashi-bazouks” (“daredevil”, “turretless”), and were attached to regular troops. Bashi-bazouks did not receive a salary and "fed" at the expense of civilians in areas where hostilities took place. Looting and terrible cruelty of the bashi-bazouks reached such an extent that they had to be appeased by regular Turkish troops.

The small arms of the Turkish army were represented by three systems of rifled guns loaded from the treasury, as well as various systems of outdated rifled and smoothbore guns loaded from the muzzle. The first and most advanced system was the single-shot American Peabody-Martini rifle of the 1870 model. The first batches of Henry-Martini rifles were sent exclusively to supply the British army, therefore, interested in modern weapons, Porta ordered rifles of the original Peabody model in the United States. The American Peabody-Martini rifle of the 1870 model was essentially no different from the English Henry-Martini, so they are often mixed. Single-shot rifle, caliber - 11.43 mm, weight - 3.8 kg (with a bayonet - 4.8 kg), rate of fire - 8-10 shots / min, aiming range - 1440, maximum range - 3600. Metal cartridge, unitary, weighed 50.5 g. According to ballistic data, this rifle was close to the Russian rifle of the Berdan system No. 2, but in some respects inferior to it. These guns were ordered by the Turkish government in the United States in the amount of 600,000 pieces, along with 40 million cartridges for them. By the beginning of the war, the Turkish army had 334,000 Peabody-Martini rifles, which accounted for 48% of all rifles loaded from the treasury of the Turkish army. Basically, modern Peabody-Martini rifles were in service with the troops fighting in the Balkan theater.

Partially, the troops were armed with a British single-shot Snyder-Enfield rifle: caliber - 14.7 mm, weight - 3.8 kg (with a scimitar bayonet - 4.9 kg), rate of fire - 7-8 rounds per minute, effective range - 550 meters , the greatest range - 1800 meters. The metal cartridge weighed 47.2 g; the cartridges were partly drawn, partly composite. The Snyder rifle was mostly purchased in England and the USA, some were converted at Turkish enterprises. 325,000 Snyder rifles were in service, which equaled 47% of all Turkish army rifles loaded from the treasury. This rifle system was armed with part of the Turkish troops in the Balkan theater and the vast majority of troops on the Caucasian front.

Rifle Snyder-Enfield

The third modern system was the American Henry Winchester-designed rifle with a 13-round underbarrel magazine, one round in the receiver and one in the barrel; all rounds could be fired in 40 seconds. The rifle was a carbine with a caliber of 10.67 mm, the effective range was 1040 m, the maximum range was 1600 m. The carbine weighed 4.09 kg, the cartridge was 33.7 g. % of all rifles of the Turkish army, loaded from the treasury. The Winchester rifle was used by the Turkish cavalry and part of the irregulars. Part of the reserve troops, the militia and irregulars were armed mainly with muzzle-loading guns of various systems. Egyptian troops (according to the states - about 65 thousand people) were armed with a rifle of the American Remington system loaded from the treasury. In addition, the Turks had a certain number of mitrailleuses of the Montigny system. Officers, cavalry and irregulars, in addition to guns (the officers did not have them), were armed with revolvers, sabers and scimitars.

Thus, in general, the tactical and technical data of the small arms of the Turkish infantry were at the level of the Russian army, but the aiming range of the Turks was somewhat higher. At the same time, the Turks had no problems with ammunition. Before the war, the Turkish Empire purchased a very significant amount of cartridges for all the systems of its small arms, loaded from the treasury (500-1000 cartridges per weapon, that is, at least 300-400 million cartridges). During the course of the war, the Porte replenished its stocks of cartridges with regular purchases from abroad, mainly from England and the USA.

Peabody Martini rifle

The field artillery of the Turkish army was equipped mainly with rifled and loaded from the treasury 4- and 6-pound (87 and 91 mm) steel guns with an initial projectile velocity of not more than 305 m / s and 3-pound bronze guns of the English Whitworth system. During the war, bronze guns began to be replaced by 55-mm steel German Krupp guns. Nine-centimeter steel Krupp cannons, fastened with rings, with a range of 4.5 km and an initial speed of 425 m / s, mounted on a gun carriage, which made it possible to give the barrel a large elevation angle and thus increase the firing range, at first there were few: in the Balkans, for example, there were at the beginning, only 48. The Turks had little of all field artillery - 825 guns. The shells were of three types: grenade, shrapnel and buckshot.

The fortress and siege Turkish artillery was well armed: it was armed with 9-cm-caliber cast-iron smoothbore guns and 28-cm howitzers; bronze smoothbore 9-, 12- and 15-cm guns; rifled and loaded from the treasury 12- and 15-cm guns, 15-cm howitzers and 21-cm mortars; steel, fastened with rings 21-, 23- and 27-cm Krupp guns; cast iron mortars 23- and 28-cm caliber, bronze mortars 15-, 23- and 28-cm caliber.

The Turkish army had a traditional problem: low tactical training, although the Ottoman troops were trained by English and German instructors. More or less, only the guards, who were trained by German specialists, were able to advance. The rest of the Turkish infantry was poorly prepared for offensive combat. The infantry was preparing to attack frontally, in dense chains with reinforcements following them. The reserves were kept away from the main forces. Bypasses of the enemy's flanks were rarely used, since the organization and preparation were poor and the troops could get upset during the maneuver. As a result, the formation and battle formations were maintained only at the beginning of the offensive, after which, in most cases, the troops huddled into a crowd. The infantry fired poorly due to poor shooting training. For a successful offensive, the Turkish army had neither staff officers, nor well-trained middle-level officers with serious combat experience, nor initiative infantry.

The main attention was paid to the defense, in which the Turkish infantry showed great perseverance. The Turkish infantry dug in well. Each battalion had a significant supply of entrenching tools. The Turkish infantry knew sapper business, fortifications were erected quickly and technically performed well. At the same time, the local population was massively used. The Turkish infantry was well supplied with ammunition and was not afraid to open fire on the advancing enemies from long distances, which strengthened their defense. The counterattacks of the Turkish troops were not successful, which is why their defense was mostly passive. Engineering and fortification art in Turkey was well developed. The empire had strong fortresses in the Caucasian and Balkan strategic directions.

Turkish artillery was best prepared. Turkish artillery fired from long distances, accurately fired a grenade, but the concentration of fire in artillery was poorly used, interaction with the infantry was not established. Worst of all was the regular cavalry - there were so few of them that they could not have any effect on the war. The irregular Turkish cavalry was completely unprepared for modern combat.

The command staff of the Turkish army, especially the highest, was extremely weak and poorly versed in military matters. Many top commanders were appointed under patronage and bought their posts. Pasha generals were mostly either foreign adventurers and rogues of all kinds (for example, Poles), or court dignitaries with minimal combat experience and military knowledge. There were very few people with a higher military education or real combat experience in the Turkish generals.

The high command was also weak. At the head of the supreme military administration was the sultan with a secret military council, which was created under him for the duration of the war. The Sultan and the Privy Council discussed and approved all the action plans of the Commander-in-Chief. The commander-in-chief, in addition, was obliged to reckon in all his actions with the minister of war (seraskir), as well as with the military council (dari-khur) attached to the minister of war. At the same time, the chief of artillery and engineering troops was not subordinate to either the commander-in-chief or the minister of war, being at the disposal of the sultan alone. Thus, the commander-in-chief was bound in the implementation of even his private plans and designs. The Turkish General Staff was also not an independent body. The General Staff consisted of 130 officers who graduated from the higher military school. These officers were mostly used for other purposes, since there were no headquarters in the full sense of the word in the Turkish army. Instead of systematic staff work, officers of the general staff often acted as personal advisers to the pashas and carried out their individual assignments.

Among the mid-level officers there were even many illiterates; only 5-10% of commanders graduated from military schools (military, artillery, engineering, military medical). Military education was weak, producing few officers. The rest of the infantry and cavalry officers were recruited from among the non-commissioned officers who had been promoted to officers, that is, those who had completed only a training team, in which it was not even necessary to be literate. The strongest in the Turkish army was the rank and file and junior command personnel, who were distinguished by discipline, endurance and perseverance in defense. At the same time, it is worth the fate that some commanders nevertheless gained combat experience during the war with Serbia and Montenegro.

Turkish military and naval industry was weak. The existing enterprises could not meet the needs of a large army (except for edged weapons), the quality of products was low. The main way to replenish the army's arsenal was to import weapons and ammunition from the United States and England. The main warships were also ordered abroad.

"Bashi-Buzuk" ("Albanian"). Painting by V. V. Vereshchagin

Fleet

Once a mighty maritime power, the Ottoman Empire gradually lost its dominance in the Black and Mediterranean Seas. The energetic Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876) tried to restore its former power. He adopted an impressive program for the construction of a steam and armored fleet, designed for foreign shipyards. So, in France in 1864-1865. built four battleships of the Osmanieh class. These were relatively large iron battery battleships. In 1868, the French built three battery-barbet battleships of the Assari Shevket type; In 1874, the British built "Messudieh" - the largest battleship of the Turkish fleet.

As a result, by the beginning of the war on the Black Sea, Turkey, with the help of England and France, created a fairly strong navy, which was many times superior to the Russian one. It consisted of: 8 armored battery frigates of the 1st-2nd rank - with a displacement of 4700 to 8000 tons, 8-16 guns of 7-9 dm caliber (only "Messudie" had 12 guns of 10 dm caliber); 5 armored battery corvettes of the 3rd rank - with a displacement of 2200-2700 tons, 4-12 guns, mostly also with a caliber of 7-9 dm; 2 double-tower armored monitors - with a displacement of 2500 tons, with 14 guns. The speed of most ships of the squadron reached 11 knots or was even slightly higher, the armor of most ships was 6 dm thick. True, Porta, having received a strong modern fleet, completely ruined the treasury, and could not redeem several ships built for it. Turkey also had the Danube Flotilla, which included armored corvettes, monitors, gunboats, steamboats and other ships, a total of 50 units (of which 9 were armored).

370 British sailors served on the ships of the Turkish fleet, of which 70 were officers. They occupied many senior command positions: Gobart Pasha - the head of the armored squadron, Montorn Bay - his assistant and chief of staff, Slimane - a mine specialist, etc. In quantitative terms, the Turkish fleet had an overwhelming superiority in the Black Sea. The command planned to actively use the fleet: to blockade Russian ports, support troops on the Danube, on the coastal flanks of the Caucasian and Balkan fronts, land troops to transport cargo for the army. But the combat training of the crews was extremely low, as was the discipline. There were almost no practical voyages, there were no mine weapons on the ships, the mine business was in its infancy. An attempt to improve the situation by inviting foreign specialists did not help. Therefore, the Turkish fleet practically could not actively operate on the high seas.

With the outbreak of the war, the Turks, having an overwhelming superiority in naval forces and taking advantage of the almost complete lack of defense of the coast of the Caucasus, tried to establish their dominance in the Black Sea. Turkish ships fired on Poti, Ochamchira, Gudauta and Sukhumi. At the end of April - the first half of May 1877, the Turks landed amphibious assault forces in this area and captured it. This was the only success achieved by the Turkish armored fleet on the Black Sea in the war of 1877-1878.

In the Balkan theater, the Russian fleet ensured the crossing of the Danube for ground forces. As a result of the active actions of mine boats and coastal artillery, as well as the skillful use of mine weapons, the enemy suffered significant losses. Two armored ships, a gunboat, several armed steamers were sunk, and two gunboats were damaged. Thus, the Russian sailors managed to paralyze the actions of the Turkish military flotilla on the Danube and thereby ensure the offensive of the Russian army in the Balkan theater.

The antiamphibious defense and the system of protecting bases and ports on the coast between the mouth of the Danube and Kerch, created by Russian sailors, was so effective that the Turkish fleet did not even try to attack them. The blockade of bases and ports, announced by the Turks on the advice of the British on April 23, 1877, turned out to be ineffective and was actually thwarted with the transition of the Black Sea Fleet forces to active operations on enemy communications. Active offensive operations, albeit with limited forces and means (using only mine weapons and armed ships), the Russian fleet began in the very first month of the war and this paralyzed the Ottoman Navy. The combat operations of the armed steamships "Grand Duke Konstantin", "Vladimir", "Vesta", "Russia", "Livadia" and others on Turkish communications were carried out throughout the war. Despite the significant superiority of the enemy in forces, Russian ships boldly went to the coastal communications of Turkey and delivered surprise attacks on them. In the summer of 1877, on sea routes near the Anatolian and Rumeli (Asian and European) coasts, they destroyed several Turkish ships. Thus, Russian mine boats and hastily armed steamships paralyzed the activities of the rather powerful Turkish armored fleet.

Battleship "Osmanie"

Results

Thus, the organization and condition of the Turkish armed forces were in a better condition than during the period Crimean War, however, were far from the state of any of the major armies of the European powers. The new organization of the Turkish army did not have time to settle down to the war with Russia. There were virtually no permanent connections at the level of regiment - division - corps. Practically 6-10 battalions (camps) were united into a brigade, division or detachment. The battalion had a staff of 774 people, in fact, the size of the battalion ranged from 100 to 650 people, so that the company often did not exceed the number of platoons adopted in European armies.

The state of the high command and the generals was unsatisfactory, there was a great shortage of middle-level officer cadres, the provision of trained staff officers, artillerymen, cavalrymen, naval officers and other specialists. Weak staffing, lack of stock of horses, artillery spare guns, modern small arms of reserve troops, militia. The artillery had modern guns, but in insufficient numbers, in addition, there were not enough well-trained gunners. And the presence in the Turkish army of "long-range" steel Krupp guns could not give it a noticeable advantage, since there were few such guns. The Turkish military industry could not provide the Turkish army with weapons and played a third-rate role in equipping it with weapons (Ottoman troops were primarily armed by England and the USA), so it could not be compared with the Russian military industry. Combat training of the Turkish army and navy on the eve of the war of 1877-1878. was at an extremely low level.

At the same time, the Turkish army was armed with modern small arms, artillery, and the fleet - modern ships. In Turkey there were well-armed strong fortresses. As a result, the Turkish army was equipped with samples of small arms that were quite modern for that time and, on the whole, was on an equal footing with the Russian army, even slightly surpassing it in the supply of ammunition.

The Turkish fleet had complete superiority over the Russian Black Sea Fleet in terms of displacement, artillery power and the number of ships of 1-2 ranks, however, poor crew training (even with the participation of foreign military experts - the British), with the excellent training of Russian sailors, destroyed this advantage. The Turkish fleet was unable to seize dominance at sea and prevent the actions of the Russian army from the coastal flanks in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

As a result, the general condition and combat training of the Russian troops on the eve of the war, despite all its major shortcomings, was significantly higher than the state of training of the Turkish army. The Russian army had an undoubted superiority over the Turkish in everything except small arms, where the situation was approximately equal. Turkey could only rely on its own defense, the mistakes of the Russian command and the military-political pressure of the West on Russia.

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During the Russian-Turkish war of 1878, two types of weapons were used: cold - bladed and firearms - rifles. According to the technical characteristics, rifles were divided into two groups: single-shot for a unitary cartridge and multi-shot (magazine). Single-shot rifles were in service with the warring parties, multi-shot rifles only with irregular formations and volunteers (Bashi-Bazouks). RIFLE BERDAN No. 2 arr. 1870 It was this gun with a caliber of 10.67 mm that became the very famous "Berdanka", which lasted twenty years in service with the army until 1891, when it was replaced by the no less famous "three-ruler" caliber 7.62 mm (Berdan Rifle), developed by Colonel American service Hiram Berdan, together with Russian officers sent to America, Colonel Gorlov and Captain Gunius, was adopted in Russia for arming rifle battalions; and the sample of 1869 - for arming all parts of the Russian troops in general.

Rifles and carbine of the Berdan-2 system of the 1870 model: 1 - infantry rifle, 2 - dragoon rifle, 3 - Cossack rifle, 4 - carbine.

bayonet for rifle berdan №2

The best rifle in Europe

Berdan-2 arr. 1870

M1868 Russian Berdan I: The Turkish army used Austrian rifles of the Wenzel (Wenzl) systems mod. 1867 and Verdl arr. 1877.

Austrian rifle of the Wenzel (Wenzl) system arr. 1867

Austrian Werdl 1877 rifle

Also, the Turkish army was equipped with Snyder rifles and Martini rifles.

Snyder breech-loading rifle model 1865 with a folding bolt, England
Breech-loading
rifle
system Martini - Henry sample 1871 with a swinging shutter (detail). England

Source: http://firearmstalk.ru/forum/showthread.php?t=107 Bashi-bazouks and Turkish regular cavalry used American rifles and carbines of the Henry and Winchester systems with an underbarrel tubular magazine. The American Winchester rifle was one of the first weapon systems chambered for a metal cartridge . It was designed, however, not by Winchester at all, but by the American gunsmith and engineer B. T. Henry for a special metal side-fire cartridge of 44 caliber (11.2 mm). In 1860, he assigned the patent and all rights to this gun to the New Haven Arms Company, owned by O. F. Winchester. Henry himself became the director of the Winchester factory, and these weapons began to be named after the owner of the company; since 1867 and the factory became known as the Winchester Repiting Arme Company. In 1866, the magazine began to be filled with cartridges through the charging hole in the receiver, and not from the front of the magazine, as was the case with Henry at first. The Winchester magazine proved to be excellent during the American Civil War (1861-1865), and later as a hunting rifle. http://corsair.teamforum.ru/viewtopic.php?f=280&t=1638

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During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, combat bladed weapons were widely used - scimitars, broadswords and sabers. In literature, scimitars and sabers are sometimes called scimitars, and sometimes this name is assigned exclusively to Janissary daggers. It is not right. Scimitar can only be called a weapon with a slight double bend. The length of the blade could be different. Janissary scimitars were really short, but cavalry samples could have blades up to 90 cm long. The weight of scimitars, regardless of their size, was at least 0.8 kg. With less weight, the weapon became difficult to cut.

scimitar

Scimitar. Balkans, early 19th century.

Scimitar in scabbard. Turkey. 19th century.


Scimitar could stab, chop and cut. Moreover, chopping blows were applied by the upper part of the blade, and cutting by the lower - concave - part. That is, they cut with a scimitar, like a saber or katana, so he did not have a guard. But there was a difference. It was not necessary to lean on the scimitar with both hands, like on a Japanese sword, it was not necessary to slowly lead it like a saber. It was enough for a foot soldier to sharply pull the scimitar back. The rider had to just hold him. The rest, as they say, was a matter of technique. The concave blade “bited” into the enemy itself. And so that the scimitar does not escape from the hand, its handle was equipped with ears tightly covering the fighter’s hand from behind. For the heaviest samples, under the usual handle there was an emphasis for the second hand.
Suffice it to say about the penetrating power of scimitars that even 50-centimeter daggers of the Janissaries pierced knightly armor. dagger), chopping and stabbing edged weapons with a straight and long blade.

Broadsword_Osman Pasha

It can have double-sided (early samples), one-sided and one-and-a-half sharpening. The length of the blade is up to 85 cm. By the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian army was armed with several models of broadswords: guards cuirassier broadswords, army cuirassier broadswords, dragoon broadswords, with the exception of dragoons in the Caucasus, which were armed with sabers. Horse artillery also had special horse artillery broadswords.

Broadsword naval officer sample 1855/1914. Russia. 19th century.
Blade length - 83.3 cm;
Blade width - 3 cm;
Total length - 98 cm.
The blades of Russian broadswords from the first decade of the 19th century were only single-edged. In the first third of the 19th century, various types of broadswords were unified: the dragoon model of 1806, the cuirassier model of 1810, and the cuirassier model of 1826 that replaced it. Broadswords were in service with cuirassiers until they were reorganized into dragoons in 1882, after which broadswords remained only in some military units as ceremonial weapons. sides of obliquely set ribs, which are a continuation of the butt and reaching the point.

Cuirassier officers' broadswords, model 1826. Made in 1855 and 1856. Chrysostom.

The naval broadsword has been used since the 16th century as a boarding weapon. In Russia, naval broadswords were introduced in the navy under Peter I. Russian naval broadswords of the 19th century differ from cavalry ones in their smaller size, shape of blades and hilts. A large number of sea ​​broadswords were made in Zlatoust in 1852-1856 and later.
http://www.megabook.ru

Russian cavalry saber model 1827, treasurer

"Infantry sabers and cleavers. Zlatoust arms factory, mid-19th century
The Russian Navy made its contribution to the defeat of the Turkish troops. Vice Admiral Russian Fleet Stepan Osipovich Makarov (1848-1904) played a huge role in the formation of naval underwater weapons in the Russian Navy. His merits in this matter include, first of all, the idea of ​​​​creating mine boats (the prototype of destroyers) and arming them with pole mines, and later with torpedoes; modernization of pole mines using stern mounts; the creation of towed mines "lionfish". In the tactics of warfare, Stepan Osipovich first used mines as an offensive weapon off the coast of the enemy during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, and carried out the first combat attack on an enemy ship with Whitehead torpedoes. Makarov provided invaluable assistance to his flagship miner K. F. Schultz in creating the world's first trawl. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. boats with pole mines, improved by S. O. Makarov, were widely used in the Russian fleet. They sunk the Turkish Selfi monitor. At the same time, S. O. Makarov developed and successfully applied a winged mine towed by a boat. Such a mine was blown up by the Turkish battleship Assari. torpedo boats and destroyers were created.
The idea of ​​creating torpedo boats belongs to the talented Russian admiral S. O. Makarov, who was the first to use torpedoes in a combat situation from boats specially equipped for torpedo firing. Russia, the first to appreciate the significance of this new weapon, built several destroyers with a displacement of 12 tons of torpedoes and the successful use of mines by the Russian fleet in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. made a strong impression on the maritime circles of other states, which possessed a large number of large ships, apparently defenseless against this new weapon, since it seemed that strong artillery and thick armor were nothing in front of a small vessel that brought death to a large ship. (MILITARY LITERATURE --[Equipment and armament]-- Shershov A)

Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 Russian army on the eve of the war

Before the war, the Russian armed forces were in a transitional state. The implementation of the military reform, begun by D. A. Milyutin back in 1862, was not completed. The creation of military districts in the 1960s facilitated the recruitment and management of troops. For better training of officers, military gymnasiums were founded, but there were few of them. The training of the required number of officers continued to be hampered by restrictions on access to officer ranks for persons of non-noble origin. During mobilization, the army's additional need for officers was estimated at 17 thousand people, but there was nowhere to take them from. In 1874, universal, more precisely, all-class military service was introduced and the term of military service was reduced from 25 to six years, which made it possible to significantly increase the number of trained reserves. But by the beginning of the war, under the new law, only two recruits were called up. The reserve of the army was still small.

The weakness of the Russian military industry slowed down the rearmament of the Russian army begun in the 1960s. Only 20% of the soldiers had improved Berdan No. 2 rifles. The rest had less long-range rifles, or even old-style muzzle-loading shotguns. The multi-system nature of small arms made it difficult to supply ammunition. The production of cartridges did not meet the needs, and their shortage during the war fettered the fighting of the Russian troops. The field artillery consisted mainly of light bronze cannons. There were no longer-range steel cannons and heavy guns capable of destroying enemy trenches and other earthen fortifications with mounted fire.

The combat training of the troops improved, but was also in a transitional stage. M. I. Dragomirov, M. D. Skobelev and a number of other generals called for abandoning the passion for parade drill, advocated bringing military training closer to the needs of a combat situation. With the support of D. A. Milyutin, they sought to train troops in the action of rifle chains instead of columns, dashes and self-digging under enemy fire. But among the conservative majority of generals and senior officers, routine prevailed - admiration for the external picturesqueness of military exercises, blind faith in the power of closed linear orders.

In the six years after the abolition of the Paris Peace, almost nothing was done to restore the fleet on the Black Sea. The light ships available there could only carry the defense of the coast, but were not suitable for operations on the high seas. Before the stronger Turkish fleet, they had only two advantages - the excellent combat skills of their teams and the mines that were in service.

The war plan was developed by General N. N. Obruchev and D. A. Milyutin in April 1877, that is, shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. It had a pronounced offensive character and was designed to quickly bring the war to a victorious end by crossing the Russian army through the Balkans and, if necessary, occupying Constantinople. Obruchev's note dated April 10, 1877 specifically emphasized that the possibility of capturing Constantinople was meant exclusively "in the military sense", as a temporary measure, but by no means with the aim of joining it and the Black Sea straits to Russia. The note determined the political goal of the war in the very general view, as "the destruction of Turkish rule in the Balkan Peninsula."

The prevailing view in government spheres was that the war with Turkey would be easy and end quickly. In terms of its organization, the level of training of officers, the Turkish army was much lower than the Russian one. Turkish artillery was insignificant. But in terms of small arms purchased in the USA and England, the Turkish troops were not inferior to the Russians and even surpassed them. British officers played the role of military advisers in the Turkish army and supervised the combat training of the Turkish fleet. The Porte hoped for the intervention of the Western powers, who incited her to war.

The rapid concentration of Russian troops for an offensive on the Balkan Peninsula was hampered not only by financial difficulties, a lack of officers and weapons, but also by external reasons. The unreliability of the position of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the fear of weakening the forces located in Poland, prompted the tsarist government not to withdraw more than a third of the troops from the Warsaw and Vilna military districts.

The tsar appointed Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, a self-confident and narrow-minded person, as commander-in-chief in the Balkan theater of operations. Other grand dukes also received important posts in the army. The commander-in-chief surrounded himself with mediocre staff and court generals. The arrival in the army of Tsar Alexander II, known for his indecisiveness and frequent change of opinion, made it even more difficult to direct military operations.

But in the course of the war, many capable military leaders distinguished themselves and came to the fore - M. I. Dragomirsv, I. P. Gurko, N. G. Stoletov, M. D. Skobelev and a number of other generals and officers who enjoyed great authority in the army.

Russia entered the war without allies. Serbia was defeated. Little heroic Montenegro continued to fight, but could not divert large Turkish forces. The success of Russian diplomacy was the conclusion of a convention with Romania on April 16, 1877 on the passage of Russian troops through its territory. In return, Russia guaranteed Romania's complete independence from Turkey. A month and a half later, Romania officially entered the war with Turkey. On April 24, the tsar's manifesto was published in Chisinau, and on the same day, Russian troops crossed the Romanian border. The purpose of the war was declared to be "improvement and ensuring the fate" of the Christian peoples under the Turkish yoke.

By the beginning of the war, Russia had concentrated a 185,000-strong army in the Balkans. The Turkish army in Northern Bulgaria numbered 160 thousand people.

The beginning of the war. The offensive of Russian troops across the Danube

The first task of the Russian army was to cross the Danube. Under enemy fire, a huge mass of troops had to cross the largest river in Western Europe in its lower high-water course, 650-700 m wide with a steep opposite bank convenient for defense. This operation, unprecedented in its size, required a long and careful preparation. The creation of the Russian Danube Flotilla was of great benefit. She blocked the access of Turkish ships to the Danube with mines and successfully acted against the Turkish river flotilla.

On June 27, unexpectedly for the enemy, the advanced units of the Russian troops on rowing iron pontoons in deep darkness, under cover of artillery fire, moved across the river in the Zimnitsa-Sistovo area. After a stubborn battle, the city of Sistovo was taken. Beyond the Danube, Russian troops launched an offensive from Sistov in three directions - to the west, south and east. The Bulgarian population enthusiastically greeted the Russian army, in which they saw their liberator from the centuries-old Turkish yoke.

With the arrival of Russian troops in Bulgaria, the national liberation movement began to expand. Under the Russian army, Bulgarian volunteer regular military squads were formed. In villages and cities spontaneously arose people's partisan detachments - couples. In battles, the Bulgarians showed a high fighting spirit. According to eyewitnesses, they went to battle, as if "to a merry holiday." But the tsarist government was afraid of a wide scope popular movement and tried to limit the participation of the Bulgarians in the war.

After crossing the Danube, the 70,000-strong detachment of Russians advancing to the east was supposed to tie down the Turkish forces located in the area of ​​​​the Ruschuk fortress. The task of the Western Detachment (about 35 thousand people) included the capture of Plevna, the most important road junction in northwestern Bulgaria. The main task was assigned to the troops, who were to develop an offensive to the south in order to capture the mountain passes connecting Northern Bulgaria with Southern Bulgaria. It was especially important to take the Shipka Pass, which was the most convenient road through the Balkans to Adrianople. Initially, this most important task was entrusted to the small Vanguard Detachment under the command of General Gurko.

In this detachment, including several Bulgarian squads, there were only 12 thousand people with 40 guns. Then the 8th Corps of General F.F. Radetsky and other units moved south.

By July 12, the advance detachment had already reached the foot of the Balkans. Leaving aside the Shipka passage, well guarded by the Turks, Gurko's detachment crossed the Balkans and one of the neighboring passes and descended into southern Bulgaria. Defeating the Turkish troops in parts, his detachment occupied the city of Kazailyk, and then hit Shipka from the rear. At the same time, the troops of General Radetsky attacked Shipka from the north. The capture of the Shipka Pass presented great difficulties. It was necessary to overcome steep mountain climbs, fighting with the enemy, who sat down behind stones and thorns. Having found themselves in a difficult situation, the Turks suddenly threw out the white flag and through the truce agreed to surrender, but it was a trick. Having received reinforcements, they again opened fire and inflicted significant damage on the Russian troops. After two days of fierce attacks, the Shipka mountain pass was taken. The Turkish troops retreated in disarray. The Bulgarian population provided great assistance to the Russian army during the battles for Shipka.

At first, the offensive also developed successfully in other directions. The Western detachment captured the Turkish fortress of Nikopol with a fight. The Russian troops advancing to the east pinned down the Turkish forces in the Ruschuk area. Successes turned heads at the headquarters of the Danube army. The court circles at headquarters imagined that the theater of war "soon would be transferred to the outskirts of Constantinople." The campaign turned into a triumphal procession. The war seemed to be coming to an end. However, the course of events suddenly changed dramatically.

On July 19, a large Turkish detachment under the command of Os-man-nashi, having covered a distance of 200 km in six days, outran the Russians and took up defense in the Plevia region. The Russian troops, whose task was to capture Plevna, were only 40 km from it (near Nikopol) and stood in complete inactivity and ignorance for two days. A small detachment then sent to Plevna was driven back with heavy losses.

The concentration of significant Turkish forces in Plevna created the threat of a flank attack on the Danube army. The second attack of Plevna, undertaken on July 30 by a 30,000th corps, was also repulsed. The tsarist generals operating near Plevna did not understand the peculiarities of the battle against the enemy's field fortifications. They forced the infantry under heavy fire to act in closely packed columns. This was the main reason for the heavy losses of the Russian army near Plevna.

It became obvious to the government that the main forces of the Danubian army could not immediately cross the Balkans.

In a note dated August 7, submitted to the tsar, Minister of War D. A. Milyutin raised the question of the need for a temporary transition of the Danube army to the defense before the arrival of reinforcements from Russia. Milyutin demanded "frugality on Russian blood." “If we continue to rely on one boundless self-sacrifice and courage of the Russian soldier,” he wrote, “then in a short time we will destroy our entire magnificent army.”

Shipka and Plevna

Meanwhile, the Turks concentrated in southern Bulgaria a 40,000-strong army under the command of Suleiman Lasha. In mid-August, his troops forced Gurko's detachment to retreat behind the Balkans with heavy fighting. After that, Suleiman Pasha attacked Shipka, trying to capture this important pass. Shipka was defended by a five thousandth Russian detachment, which included several Bulgarian squads. These forces were clearly not enough, and General Stoletov, who commanded the detachment, correctly assessed the situation. On August 17, he reported to the commander of the southern front, General Radetsky: “... The entire corps of Suleiman Pasha, visible to us at a glance, is lining up against us 8 miles from Shipka. The forces of the enemy are enormous, I say this without exaggeration; we will defend ourselves to the extreme, but reinforcements are urgently needed. However, Radetsky, misled by intelligence, was waiting for the offensive of Suleiman Pasha on the left flank. He regarded the appearance of the Turks at Shipka as a false demonstration and did not send reserves to Stoletov.

In the early morning of August 21, Suleiman Pasha launched an assault on the Russian positions. For three days, a small Russian-Bulgarian detachment held back the onslaught of the enemy, who had a five-fold superiority in strength. Shipka's defenders had few rounds of ammunition, and they had to fight off up to 14 attacks a day. Often the soldiers met the enemy with a hail of stones and threw him away with bayonets. The situation was aggravated by unbearable heat and lack of water. The only source - the stream was under fire from the Turks, and the path to it was strewn with rows of corpses, the number of which grew every hour.

At the end of the third day of fighting, the position of Shipka's heroes became desperate. The Turks surrounded the Russian positions from three sides. The defenders broke down guns, ran out of shells and ammunition. Enemy attacks were repelled with hand grenades and bayonets. The threat of complete encirclement loomed. At this moment, the long-awaited help finally came. Radetsky himself led a rifle brigade to Shipka. It was followed by the division of General Dragomirov. Exhausted from fatigue after a hard march through the mountains in forty-degree heat, the soldiers who arrived immediately rushed into battle. A Russian “Hurrah!” burst out over Shipka. The environmental threat has been eliminated. At night, the Shipka defenders received water and hot food, ammunition and shells. The attacks of Su-leyman Pasha continued in the following days, but were not successful. In the end, the Turks retreated. The Shipka pass remained in the hands of the Russians, but the Turks held its southern slopes.

Going on the defensive in other parts of the theatre, the command of the Danube Army was building up strength for a new attack by Plevna. Guards and grenadier units that arrived from Russia, as well as Romanian troops (28 thousand), were thrown here. In total, 87 thousand people were drawn to Plevna with 424 guns. Osman Pasha by this time had 36 thousand people and 70 guns. Having ensured a significant superiority in forces, the Russian command hoped for an easy and decisive victory.

This self-confidence has given bad results. The plan for the upcoming assault, worked out at the headquarters of the Danube army, testified to very little sophistication in the art of war and demonstrated insufficient awareness of the disposition of enemy forces. The lessons of the first two assaults were not taken into account. As in previous battles near Plevna, the main forces were sent to the most powerful section of the Turkish fortifications - the Grivitsky redoubts. The plan of attack was based only on the prowess of the Russian soldier. A preliminary four-day shelling of Turkish positions with light guns did not produce significant results.

Despite the rain and impassable mud, the third assault on Plevna was scheduled for the day of the royal name day - And September. Attacks on the Grivitsky redoubts were repulsed. The Russian regiments attacked other sections of the Turkish positions separately and also failed.

Only a detachment of General Skobelev operated successfully on the left flank of the Russian troops. Using a thick fog, he secretly approached the enemy and broke through his fortifications with a swift attack. But, having not received reinforcements, Skobelev's detachment was forced to retreat the next day.

The third assault on Plevna ended complete failure. This failure and the heavy losses of troops near Plevna made a depressing impression on the army and Russian society. The war was obviously dragging on. Resentment against the government grew in advanced social circles. In the famous folk song "Dubinushka" the words appeared:

On the name day of the king, to please him,

Many thousands of soldiers laid down ...

After the third failure of the Russian army near Captivity, Turkish troops made an attempt to go on the offensive and break through to Northern Bulgaria. On the night of September 17, the main forces of Suleiman Pasha's army attacked Shipka again, but to no avail. After September 17, the Turkish command did not make decisive attacks on Shipka, but kept the Russian detachment under continuous fire in the hope that it would not withstand the defense in winter conditions.

Experiencing severe hardships, Russian troops and Bulgarian militias held the Shipka pass for four months. Hot food and water were delivered to the forward positions at night, and during snow storms the delivery was stopped. The number of frostbite sometimes reached 400 people a day. When a snowstorm rose on Shipka and the shooting died down, the St. Petersburg newspapers wrote: "Everything is calm on Shipka." This stereotypical phrase from the reports of General Radetsky, who commanded the troops on Shipka, served as the title for the famous painting by V.V. Vereshchagin. The main losses of the Russian troops were on Shipka from cold and disease. From September to December 1877, the Russians and Bulgarians lost 700 people killed, and 9,500 people who were frostbitten, sick and frozen.

"Shipka seat" is a glorious page in the history of military commonwealth of the Bulgarian and Russian peoples. At the top of the mountain now rises a monument-tomb with the image of two warriors bowing their heads - a Bulgarian and a Russian.

The successful defense of Shipka prevented the invasion of the Turkish army into Northern Bulgaria and the inevitable massacre of the Bulgarian population in this case. It greatly facilitated the successful blockade of Plevna and the subsequent passage of the Russian army through the Balkans.

In three assaults on Plevna, the Russians lost 32 thousand, the Romanians - 3 thousand people, and the goal was not achieved. The commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, was completely at a loss and believed that the Russian army should return across the Danube. On September 13, at the military council, D. A. Milyutin insisted on another decision - to stay in the same positions and wait for the arrival of reinforcements.

To develop a plan for further actions, General E. I. Totleben, who since the defense of Sevastopol was considered the greatest authority on questions of serfdom war, was summoned from St. Petersburg. Having ascertained the situation on the spot, Totleben came to the conclusion that Plevna should be besieged and taken by starvation. In the absence of heavy artillery capable of destroying the Turkish fortifications with mounted fire, starting a new assault on Plevna was clearly a hopeless affair.

In the Plevna fortified camp, a 50,000-strong Turkish army was surrounded. Equipped with ammunition and guns in abundance, the Turks had only 21 days of food supplies. It could be expected that they would try to break through the blockade ring. Therefore, Russian troops from night to night built new and refurbished old fortifications. In the event of a breakthrough, reserves were prepared in advance for a counterattack. These preparations were very timely. When the food and fodder supplies in Plevna were depleted, Osman Pasha's army broke through the Russian positions, but was driven back by the reserve that came to the rescue. November 28 (December 10) she capitulated. 43,338 people were taken prisoner, led by Osman Pasha.

The fall of Plevna was a major victory. Turkey lost its best army and the only talented commander. In the course of the war, a decisive turning point took place, achieved, however, at the cost of the lives of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers. This is reminiscent of the monument to those killed near Plevna, erected in Moscow. In Bulgaria, the day of the fall of Plevna is celebrated as a significant date in the history of the country.

Military operations in Transcaucasia. Siege and assault on Kars

Military operations in Transcaucasia also assumed a protracted character. The commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army (over 100 thousand people with 276 guns), Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, showed neither skill nor energy in the performance of his duties. More than a third of the troops were deployed in different parts of the Caucasus in case of uprisings, which Turkish emissaries tried to raise among the Muslims, and for the defense of the sea coast. For military operations, the 60,000th Active Caucasian Corps was created under the command of General Loris-Melikov. On the very first day of the war, he was launched on the offensive against the 70,000-strong Turkish army. Initially, the advance of the Russian army was successful. On May 16, one of the detachments stormed the fortress of Ardagan. Another detachment occupied Bayazet and laid siege to Kars. But the tsarist generals, due to poor intelligence, exaggerated the enemy's forces and acted so slowly and indecisively that the Turkish command managed to bring up large reinforcements. The siege of Kars had to be lifted, and the Russian garrison in Bayazet was surrounded and repelled Turkish attacks with great effort, until the Russian detachment sent to the rescue broke through the encirclement and opened the way to retreat. Holding Ardagan, the Russian army went on the defensive. Turkish troops landed in Abkhazia, but were driven out from there.

Only with the arrival of strong reinforcements in October 1877 was it decided to launch a new offensive against Kars and Erzurum. A major role in its preparation was played by the new Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Army, General N. N. Obruchev, and the commander of one of the detachments, General A. N. Lazarev. On October 15, Russian troops attacked the Turkish army of Mukhtar Pasha at the Aladzhin Heights from three sides and defeated it. Having lost about 20 thousand people, the Turks retreated in disarray. But the subsequent attempt by the Russian troops to take Erzurum by storm ended in failure. The outstanding success of the Russian army was the capture in November of Kars, which was considered an impregnable fortress. The French military agent General de Courcy, leaving the Caucasus, said to the Russian commander in chief: “I saw the Kars forts, and one thing I can advise is not to attack them, there are no human forces for this. Your troops are so good that they will go to these impregnable rocks, but you will put them all to the last and will not take a single fort. The strengths of the Kars Fortress were the lack of an advantageous artillery position for the attacker, the mutual defense of the forts, and a wide shelling front in front of them. The garrison of Kars consisted of 30 thousand people. with 122 guns. According to the plan of Obruchev and Lazarev, the Russian troops began to prepare for the assault. It was decided to produce it at night, when the Turks had to fire at random. Local Armenian guides undertook to point out the passages to the forts On the night of November 18, with a surprise attack, Russian troops captured all the most important fortifications of Kars in a few hours. Most of the garrison (18 thousand people, including five pashas and English officers who led the defense of the fortress) were taken prisoner. The night assault on the Kars fortress was an outstanding achievement of Russian military art.

But Kars was far from the Turkish capital. His fall could not force Turkey to accept Russian terms of peace. Operations in the Balkans were decisive.

The final stage of the war

The fall of Plevna radically changed the military situation. An almost 100,000-strong army with 394 guns was released for further action. The Russian victories caused a new upsurge in the national liberation struggle of the Balkan peoples against the Turkish yoke. Serbia declared war on Turkey and moved its troops on the offensive. Montenegrins occupied the port of Antivari.

The Russian army faced an even more difficult transition through the Balkans. The chief of the German General Staff, Moltke, declared that the Russian troops would not be able to cross the Balkan Range with fighting in winter conditions, and allowed the Prussian military observers with the Russian army to go on vacation. Bismarck folded a map of the Balkan Peninsula and said that he would not need it until spring. British military experts thought so too. But it was impossible to postpone the crossing of the Balkans until spring. For the wintering of Russian troops in Bulgaria there was neither housing nor food supplies. In a few months, the Turkish army would have recovered from its losses, and England and Austria-Hungary could prepare for a move against Russia. D. A. Milyutin insisted on an immediate offensive in order to use the disorder of the Turkish army after the fall of Plevna and prevent the intervention of the Western powers.

The Russian army at that time had 314 thousand people with 1343 guns against 183 thousand Turkish troops with 441 guns, which gave almost double superiority in forces.

On December 12, at a military council with the participation of the tsar, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, D. A. Milyutin and other generals, it was decided to deliver the main blow in the direction of Sofia and Adrianople with the right flank of the Russian army, that is, the troops of General Gurko through the Western Balkans. The remaining troops of the Russian Danube army were to go to the Balkans through the mountain passes of Troyan and Shipka.

On December 25, the main forces of the 60,000-strong Gurko detachment moved through the Churyak pass. Better dressed and shod healthy soldiers were selected for the campaign. Only four guns were left in the batteries. The shells were taken out of the charging boxes and carried by hand, tied in caps. The guns were assigned to the companies. They were carried on straps. On steep mountain climbs, they took several dozen steps, put a stone or log under the wheels and rested. On icy roads, notches were made on ice and stones. The descent was even more difficult. On December 26, after the rain, a blizzard broke out, frost hit. From the sparkle of snow and a blizzard, many had inflamed eyes. Clothes are icy. The Bulgarians cleared the road, gave food and pack horses, showed the way. The passage of General Gurko's troops through the Balkans took six days and was carried out day and night, often in complete darkness.

Rejecting the advance detachments of the Turks, the Russian troops entered Sofia on January 4, 1878, where huge Turkish warehouses of food and ammunition were captured.

On the same day, another Russian detachment under the command of General Kartsov began to cross the Balkans (6 thousand people with 24 guns). This detachment moved along the steep slopes in the area of ​​the Troyan Pass. The Turkish positions on the pass were at first skillfully bypassed by the column sent forward, and as soon as it appeared in the rear of the Turkish redoubt, the Russian troops from the front hit with bayonets. Skillful maneuver made it possible to overcome the difficult pass with few losses. The task of the Kartsev detachment was to support the crossing of the ridge by the troops of General Radetzky.

The 54,000th detachment of General Radetzky was located north of Shipka against the 23,000th army of Wesselp Pasha. The main forces of the Turks concentrated at the southern exit from the Shipka pass in a fortified camp near the village of Sheinovo, surrounded by redoubts, trenches and artillery batteries. It was decided to bypass Sheinovo. For this purpose, a column of General Skobelev of 16,500 bayonets was allocated with the task of crossing the Balkans west of Shipka. Another column of 18 thousand bayonets was to move to Sheinovo through the passes located east of the Shipka positions.

The offensive began on 5 January. The troops of the left column crossed the Balkans and approached the Turkish redoubts. More difficult was the passage through the Balkans of the column of General Skobelev. For three kilometers she had to move along an icy sloping cornice over the abyss, and then followed by a descent with a steepness of 45 °, along which the soldiers moved down on “natural sledges”. On January 8, the left column launched an attack, but Skobelev's column did not finish the descent from the mountains and was not ready to fight. The non-simultaneity of the actions of individual columns complicated the battle and led to unnecessary losses. On January 9, Radetzky launched a frontal attack on the Turkish fortifications, but was only able to occupy the advanced trenches. The outcome of the battle was decided by the transition to the attack of the Skobelev column. Her success was ensured by good preparation of the attack. Rifle chains moved in dashes, which were made at a time when the lying arrows supported those running forward with fire. Approaching the Turkish redoubts at 300 steps, the companies rose and went on the attack. The Turkish redoubts were taken. Sheinov's garrison was completely surrounded and capitulated along with the Turkish troops, who had settled on the southern slope of the Shipka pass. In total, over 20 thousand people were taken prisoner. The way to Adrianople was open.

By mid-January 1878, a nearly 160,000-strong army was concentrated behind the Balkans, twice the strength of the Turks, who were retreating in disorder to Philippopolis (Plovdiv). Mass desertion reduced the Turkish troops by another 18-20 thousand people. Fleeing from the threat of encirclement, the Turks left Plovdiv without a fight. A three-day battle south of this city completely upset the remnants of the Turkish army. On January 20, Russian troops solemnly entered Adrianople without a fight, met with enthusiastic greetings from the Bulgarians and Greeks. The roads to the south of the city were blocked by fleeing Turkish troops. The Russian cavalry, pursuing the retreating troops, reached the coast of the Sea of ​​Marmara. Large Russian forces began to concentrate near Constantinople and in the vicinity of the Dardanelles. The defeat of the Turkish army was complete.

During the offensive of the Russian army, the Bulgarian population everywhere armed itself and seized the lands of the Turkish landowners. In northern Bulgaria, their lands, livestock and other property were transferred to the Bulgarians even earlier. The tsarist authorities saw this as a military measure, but objectively, the elimination of Turkish feudal landownership in Bulgaria during the Russian-Turkish war was a social upheaval that cleared the way for the country's bourgeois development.